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Abstract
We develop a model that allows us to understand the cyclicality of part and full-time
employment. In the model, labor market frictions generate a surplus between workers and
firms, who jointly decide whether their employment relationship is best suited for part
or full-time work based on match quality shocks and the broader economic environment.
Lower acyclical costs cause the surplus of part-time matches to vary less with the business
cycle than the surplus of full-time matches. As a consequence, the model is able to
generate procyclical full-time employment and countercyclical part-time employment as
observed in the data. We also show that ignoring part-time employment understates the
impact on employment and inequality of a recession and that subsidizing part-time work
is far more effective than increasing unemployment insurance at preventing a labor market
downturn.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession and the recent Covid-19 experience have emphasized the importance of
closely monitoring part-time work.1 This is the case as it can provide additional information
regarding the performance of an economy.2 If part-time is ignored, aggregate unemployment
numbers may understate the true economic slack over the business cycle. Within the context
of a labor search framework, this is the case as worker flows across different employment states
are critical in shaping unemployment dynamics.3 But, is part-time employment an impor-
tant feature of the labor market? Are its associated dynamics different to those of full-time
employment?
Since the mid-1990s slightly more than one in six U.S. civilian employees worked in jobs
classified as part-time. In the last decade, this share rose from about 17% in 2007 to nearly 20%
in 2009. Not only part-time employment has been quantitatively important, its business cycle
properties have also been rather different.4 Over the last four decades, full-time employment has
been highly procylical, while part-time employment has been acylical or slightly countercyclical.
We have also observed a lot of within-job transitions between part and full-time employment. In
particular, workers have transitioned from full-time to part-time employment (6.5% monthly)
more frequently than from full-time work to unemployment (0.7% monthly). These flows have
not been symmetric. In an expansion workers have transitioned from part-time to full-time,
while in a recession we have observed a flow from full-time to part-time employment.5 Similar
labor market regularities have been documented by Canon et al. (2014), Borowczyk-Martins
and Lalé (2019) and Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2020), among others.
In this paper we propose a framework that can account for these empirical regularities. By
considering a more granular treatment of employment, we are able to better understand the
mechanisms driving employment flows and shed light some important aggregate labor market
phenomena. In particular, we provide answers to the following questions: How much of the part
and full-time employment rates over the business cycle is directly caused by aggregate shocks
relative to the endogenous adjustments made by firms? What do we miss when part-time
employment is ignored? Does an expansion of the unemployment insurance during a recession
1The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) classifies part-time employment as a situation where workers
are employed fewer than 35 hours per week.
2Federal Reserve Chair Yellen (2014) noted that the elevated number of workers who are employed part-time
but desire full-time work might imply that the degree of resource underutilization in the labor market is greater
than what is captured by the standard unemployment rate. Additional information can be found in Yellen
(2014).
3Workers who report that they are working part-time for economic reasons rise almost in lock step with the
increase in unemployment and the decline in full-time employment. This regularity is observed in virtually all
developed countries.
4We refer the reader to Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2019) and the data section for more details.
5We refer the reader to Section 3 for more details on the empirical regularities of full and part-time employ-
ment.
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increase overall employment and output relative to a "job-subsidy" scheme?
To answer these questions, we propose a framework that builds on Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). In particular, we consider firms offering part and full-time employment. When hiring,
employers face differential acyclical fixed costs that differ across employment types.6 Given a
productivity of a match, firms and workers choose the type of employment. Conditional on
such arrangement, firms and workers contract wages through bargaining. Over time, matches
are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which may cause the match to dissolve or transition to the
other employment state. Given this structure, we estimate the model using simulated method
of moments, matching key labor market targets. We then perform a series of counterfactual
exercises to answer the previous questions. Finally, we consider the effectiveness of different
labor market policies, that are revenue neutral, at limiting the size and duration of downturns
in the labor market. In particular, we compare the labor market and output consequences of
implementing an extension of unemployment insurance during a recession versus a "job-subsidy"
scheme.
We find that our framework is capable of matching the degree of cyclicality in nearly all flows
in the labor market, though it does not match the magnitudes of the fluctuations. In particular,
the model delivers the observed flows and hours of part-time and full-time employment in the
data. We also show that the majority of flows between part and full-time are caused by
adjustments in the endogenous separation thresholds. In particular, the part-time separation
threshold is less cyclical than the full-time one. This results in full-time employment being
procyclical and part-time employment being countercyclical. We are also able to capture the
differences in labor market outcomes when agents face small and large recessions. In particular,
in smaller recessions (such as the 2001 recession) part-time employment can absorb much of
the drop in full-time employment. This is not the case for larger recessions (such as the Great
recession of 2007) and substantial drops in both types of employment is observed. Key for our
results is the fact that fixed costs are lower for part-time employment. As a result, full-time
surplus expands proportionally more during expansions, while it shrinks during contractions.
To determine the major source of cyclicality generated by our framework, we consider several
counterfactual experiments. When only idiosyncratic shocks are considered, the cyclicality of
separations increases substantially. In contrast when firms are allowed to adjust away from
its steady-state value, the cyclicality of flows into unemployment are reversed, and job-finding
rates become nearly acyclical.
Differences, over the business cycle, between part and full-time employment partly reflect an
6Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) also showed that training costs increase the volatility of job finding.
Part and full-time employment are critically shaped by legislation, resulting in different costs and legal require-
ments. For instance, in the U.S., full-time jobs often offer paid time-off and employer-sponsored retirement
programs. Moreover, employing firms are required to provide health insurance to workers. These features are
not present in part-time employment arrangements.
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additional margin of adjustment. Thanks to part-time employment and in response to fluctua-
tions in demand for firms’ output, employers can vary the intensity of labor utilization without
having to fire/hire new workers.7 In economic downturns, reducing hours of current employees
allows employers to avoid layoffs and save on future hiring and training costs. Moreover, during
recessions workers have lower outside options, so they are more likely to accept a part-time job.
On the other hand, in booms hiring is more difficult due intense competition for workers. Thus,
firms have an incentive to increase the working hours of current employees by offering full-time
employment.8 Our findings highlight that these margin of adjustment are relevant for aggregate
labor market outcomes. In particular, when the economy enters into a recession, we show that
environments without part-time employment understate the size of the decline in labor market
employment and their effect on workers.
Finally, taking into account the different policies implemented during Covid-19, we con-
sider the effectiveness of extending an unemployment insurance during a recession versus a
"job-subsidy" scheme.9 In particular, we impose a 7% decline in aggregate productivity and
implement different labor market policies that are revenue neutral. First, we institute a 20%
increase in unemployment benefits. Then, we consider a job subsidy. Despite small changes in
each acyclical costs, both job-subsidy policies recover more rapidly and suffer a smaller decline
than an expansion of unemployment insurance. In particular, we find that the economy with
the part-time subsidy nearly has no decline in employment despite a drop in aggregate produc-
tivity of 7%. On the other hand, the full-time job subsidy scheme results in a larger decline in
employment and output than the part-time subsidy. Nevertheless, it also performs better than
an expansion of unemployment insurance.
2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the literature of part and full-time employment. Within the empirical
literature, Canon et al. (2014) find that part-time workers for economic reasons are typically less
educated than full-time and are typically employed in middle or low-skill occupations.10 In the
7There exists ample empirical evidence that firms hire part-time workers as a form of flexible labor. Using
Canadian firm-level data, Zeytinoglu (1992) finds that organizational flexibility is a major argument to hire
part-time workers. On the basis of international firm-level data, Delsen (1995) finds that the introduction of
part-time employment has led to positive outcomes for firms in several European countries.
8Using firm-level data, Friesen (1997) shows that part-time work plays a distinct role in the adjustment
strategies of UK firms.
9In the U.S. and Australia, among other countries, during Covid-19 policymakers have enacted increases in
unemployment insurance and "job-subsidy" schemes.
10On average, part-time workers for economic reasons (PTER) workers earn 19 percent less than full-time
workers and 9 percent less (per hour) than part-time workers for non-economic reasons (PTNER), even after
controlling for sociodemographic and occupational characteristics. The differences persist if we compare wages
of PTER to wages of other workers within broad occupational categories.
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aftermath of the 2007-09 recession, Canon et al. (2014) also find that changes in the transition
probabilities to and from part-time worker for economic reasons were mainly associated with
changes in the composition of employment.11 Using a Markov chain model, Borowczyk-Martins
and Lalé (2019) find similar results for the U.S. and United Kingdom. In particular, the au-
thors show that cyclical variation in hours per worker is driven to a large extent by fluctuations
in the share of part-time employed workers.12 Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2019) also find
that the bulk of the variation in the part-time employment share is accounted for by cyclical
fluctuations in transition rates between full-time and part-time work.13 They also show that
the incidence of involuntary part-time employment among new part-time workers increases dra-
matically in recessions, and is mostly driven by full-time workers facing slack work conditions.
Valletta et al. (2020) find that structural factors, notably shifts in the industry composition
of employment, have held the incidence of involuntary part-time work slightly more than 1
percentage point above its pre-recession level. Using these insights, Borowczyk-Martins and
Lalé (2020) develop an adjustment procedure to construct U.S. monthly time series of involun-
tary part-time employment stocks and flows since 1976. The authors establish that involuntary
part-time employment is a very transitory labor market state.14 Its main source of variation is
found to be cyclical and it is predominantly driven by within-employment reallocation.15 Fi-
nally, Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2020) also find that fluctuations in involuntary part-time
employment flows exhibit systematic patterns over the business cycle.
Within the context of a theoretical model, Chang et al. (2011) construct a family model of
labor supply that considers full and part-time employment. Individuals are subject to idiosyn-
cratic shocks that affect their productivity in market work. The authors assume that there is
a wage penalty associated with part-time work and can be gender specific.16 A representative
firm produces output according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology in cap-
ital and efficiency units of labor. Using simulated data from the steady state of the calibrated
model, Chang et al. (2011) find positive estimated elasticities that are larger for women and
that are highly significant, but they bear virtually no relationship to the underlying preference
parameters. Within a different framework, and closest to our spirit, Warren (2015) models
part-time work focusing on a firm’s decision to hire, fire, or partially utilize its labor force.
11The authors used counterfactual exercises similar to Shimer (2012).
12This holds for the major recessions of the past five decades in the U.S. and for the Great Recession in the
United Kingdom.
13The authors also find that cyclical variation in transitions between full-time and part-time work is pre-
dominantly accounted for by transitions at the same employer. Moreover, transitions between full-time and
part-time work at the same employer entail sizable and lumpy adjustments in individual working hours.
14An average spell lasts about 30% less than an average unemployment spell.
15Transitions to and from full-time and voluntary part-time employment account for just over three quarters
of the short-run variation in involuntary part-time work.
16These assumptions can help capture the fact that men and women have differential labor supply across
occupations.
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Firms are heterogeneous in size and productivity, and subject to search frictions. The model
produces patterns of part-time utilization by firms over the age, size, and employment growth
distribution. Firm-level utilization of part-time employment is consistent with the character-
istics of worker flows in the CPS. In aggregate, the model matches the relative volatility of
unemployment and part-time for economic reasons over the business cycle. Part-time labor
utilization by firms increases the volatility in vacancies and unemployment in the model rela-
tive to the case with only an extensive margin. Finally, Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2018)
analyze differences in involuntary part-time work and unemployment spells through the lens
of the incomplete-market and job-search model of Acemoglu and Shimer (2000). The authors
consider two sources of insurance against idiosyncratic labor market risks. There is private
insurance through a risk-free asset where the worker can save but cannot borrow. In addition,
there is public insurance against the risk of becoming unemployed. Since the authors are only
interested in the worker’s decision problem, all prices (interest rates, wages, etc.) are exoge-
nous and fixed. A calibration of this environment, consistent with U.S. institutions and labor
market dynamics, shows that involuntary part-time work generates lower welfare losses relative
to unemployment.
We complement these papers by proposing a simple framework framework of part and full-
time employment that can capture the cyclicality of various employment flows. We also deter-
mine whether business cycle is directly caused by aggregate shocks relative to the endogenous
adjustments made by firms. We also highlight what is missing when part-time employment is
ignored.
3 Empirical Regularities
Before delving into the model in this section we document regularities about the cyclicality of
part and full-time employment. We use these facts to inform key aspects of our theoretical
framework. We also use this data to discipline the choice of structural parameters describing
the economy.
Throughout, the data considered in this paper is the Current Population Survey (CPS) that
spans from 1996 to 2019. This is the standard data set used to explore employment over time
in the US. We impose standard sample restrictions, limiting our data to white prime-age males
with a Bachelors Degree or less.
3.1 Cyclicality of Part and Full-Time Utilization
We start by using the CPS to document regularities about the relationship between cyclicality
of part and full-time employment and aggregate employment. In Figure 3.1 we plot aggregate
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employment, which is depicted in the left panel. We disaggregate this measure by part and
full-time status in the left panel; where part-time is given by the green line and full-time by


























Employment Rates by Type (seas.-adjust)
(b) Employment rates by type. Source: CPS.
Figure 3.1: Employment rates between 1996 and 2018.
As Figure 3.1 shows, full-time employment is procyclical, while part-time work and unem-
ployment are both countercyclical. Because full-time work contributes the most to the total
number of jobs, aggregate employment is then procyclical.
The previous employment aggregates could have been generated by a variety of different
flows. To provide additional insights to these employment patterns, we also document how
flows between part and full-time employment evolve during the business cycle. In particular,
Figure 3.2 reports the gross transition rates out of part and full-time employment. In the left
panel we plot flows from full-time to part-time employment and from full-time employment to
unemployment. In the right panel we report the time series of flows from part-time to full-time












Flows from Full-Time (seas.-adjust)












Flows from Part-Time Econ. (seas.-adjust)
(b) Flows from part-time employment. Source: CPS.
Figure 3.2: Employment flows
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Figure 3.2 clearly shows that flows out of full-time employment are countercyclical, while
flows from part-time to full-time employment are procyclical. In contrast, flows from part-time
employment to unemployment are acyclical.
To provide some insight into the source of cyclicality for both full and part-time employment,
we analyze how the ratio of flows varies over the business cycle. In the left of Figure 3.2 we
depict the ratio of part-time to unemployment flows relative to full-time to unemployment
flows, both as a fraction of employment in their respective type. In the right panel, we present
the ratio of part-time to full-time flows relative to full-time to part-time flows. Finally, in












PTE to U/FT to U
Flows (seas.-adjust)










PTE to FT/FT to PTE
Flows (seas.-adjust)











U to PTE/U to FT
Flows from Unemp. (seas.-adjust)
(c) Ratio of U→FT to U→PT. Source: CPS.
Figure 3.3: Ratios of employment flows.
As we can see from Figure 3.3, as a fraction of employment, part and full-time flows to
unemployment are roughly constant over the business cycle. However, only during the Great
Recession, these ratios slightly decrease. In contrast, the ratio of flows between employment
status are strongly procyclical.Thus, we can conclude that these flows are the main source
of the observed cyclicality. Similarly, flows out from unemployment are strongly procyclical,
mirroring the pattern of flows to and from full-time employment. We also find that the ratio
of flows between part and full-time employment are roughly equal to the ratio of flows to
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unemployment times the ratio of the flows from unemployment. These findings suggest that
the same factors that drive the flows between part and full-time employment also drive the
flows out of unemployment.
3.2 Differences Between Part and Full-Time Work
Our findings here as well as in Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2018), Warren (2015), among oth-
ers, suggest that modeling part and full-time employment requires more nuance than traditional
intensive margins of adjustment. While utilization fluctuates in ways consistent with continu-
ous adjustment of hours, observed adjustment of hours tends to be "lumpy," with few workers
actually congregating at the 35 hour a week margin. In addition, as we discuss subsequently,
these jobs differ along a few key dimensions.
Although many papers mainly exploit the pure intensive margin to capture the procyclicality
of aggregate hours, closer inspection shows that most of this fluctuation is caused by movements
between part and full-time employment. Figure 3.4 shows that decomposing the labor force
between full and part-time work is critical in determining the major source of fluctuations.
The left panel plots the full-time employment, part-time employment, and the unemployment
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(b) Average hours worked weekly from 1994 to 2017 by utilization.
Source: CPS.
Figure 3.4: Hours worked over time by utilization.
Figure 3.4 shows that although hours are procyclical, very little of its fluctuation is captured
by a traditional intensive margin. Instead, the bulk of the change in hours worked are driven
by movements between part and full-time employment over the business cycle. This is a point
also emphasized by Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2019), who note that the majority of these
flows are within employer.17
17Warren (2015) also notes that the majority of flows between part and full-time work is within employers.
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To gain a deeper insight about these facts, Figure 3.5 depicts the flows between full and










Full-Time-to-Part-Time for Econ. Change in LabActHrs (seas.-adjust)












Part-Time for Econ.-to-Full-Time Change in LabActHrs (seas.-adjust)
(b) Change in hours worked from PTE-FE utilization change over
time. Source: CPS.
Figure 3.5: Changes in hours worked over time.
Surprisingly, neither of the flow series displays any cyclicality. Moving from full-time to
part-time employment results in an average reduction of 18 hours. While this number varies
over time, it does not co-move with the business cycle. Similarly, moving from a job that was
part-time to a full-time job entails a gain of roughly 17.5 hours. This increase in hours worked
also does not co-move with the business cycle. Moreover, the variability in hours for part or
full-time workers is minimal. Noticeable changes are only observed when a worker shifts from
full to part-time work or vice versa.
This latter observation is captured in Figure 3.6. In particular, the left panel plots a his-
togram of hours changes for full-time workers, highlighting changes to part-time work. Instead,
the right panel does the same for part-time work.
(a) Changes in hours, FT-FT vs. FT-PTE. Source: CPS. (b) Changes in hours, PTE-PTE vs. PTE-FT. Source: CPS.
Figure 3.6: Histogram of hours changes.
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This figure suggests that moving to part-time employment is more than just a mere intensive
margin adjustment. This change entails a sizable loss of hours.
In addition to hours, what other differences do we observe between part and full-time
employment? Jepsen (2001) finds that part-time jobs require fewer skills, and thus less training
than full-time jobs. This training is often firm-specific, and entails a cost, in the event of
separation, that is shared by both parties. Research also suggests that training is acyclical or
mildly procyclical as in Mendez and Sepulveda (2012). Furthermore Bonamy and May (1997)
find that part-time work is often inefficient because it can create communication gaps. As a
result, it may produce a lower surplus for firms. Additional fixed costs (such as administrative
costs, provision of fringe benefits, etc.) are independent of hours. Thus, they increase non-
linearly with the amount worked as argued by Montgomery (1988).
Consistent with prior work, we also document in Figure 3.7 that the cost of providing
benefits to part-time workers is both acyclical and consistently lower than the cost of providing



















Total Benefits (2010 $s)
Figure 3.7: Cost of Total Benefits (Hourly)
These benefits may be available to the unemployed, provided inefficiently, or never used by
workers, leading to a deadweight loss in the surplus. Taken together, these differences suggest
that part-time work and full-time work yield different levels of output, entail different costs,
that these costs may be sunk in the event of unemployment, and that they are largely acyclical.
Summarizing, the evidence presented in this Section suggests that, when developing the
theoretical framework to understand the labor market, full and part-time employment should
be treated as two separate employment states. We are not alone in recognizing this dichotomy
in the data: Chang et al. (2011), Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2018), and Warren (2015),
among others, suggest that modeling part and full-time employment requires more nuance
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than traditional intensive margins of adjustment. Our findings here also suggests that the
framework should treat hours worked, within these two employment types, as fixed. Changes
in hours are "lumpy," where traditional models that optimize over a continuous choice of hours
would suggest continuous jumps in hours. In addition, the part and full-time job appear to
have different characteristics despite frequent within job transitions between utilization and
these differences are often acyclical. Next we present a model that incorporates these features,
which can be used to better understand part and full-time employment over the business cycle.
4 Framework
We extend Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) to incorporate part and full-time work. Upon
meeting, firms and workers choose optimally whether their match is best served with full-time
work, part-time work, or by both parties pursuing other matches. They contract on both a
wage and employment schedule by bargaining, given the productivity of a match. There is a
unit mass of atomistic workers, and an infinite mass of atomistic firms. Time is continuous,
and the payoff flow for both firms and workers is discounted at rate r. Workers may be either
unemployed and receive flow utility b, or employed and receive a flow payout w, which depends
on match characteristics. Firms may be unmatched, and waiting to match with a worker, or
matched and receiving flow profits zǫYT − w − τT , where ǫ is a match-specific component, z
is a common aggregate shocks, YT is the type-specific productivity. τT is an acyclical cost
that depends on employment type, but not aggregate productivity. In our benchmark model,
we consider the steady-state equilibrium and perform comparative statics on the aggregate
component. After characterizing the existence of part and full-time employment, we generalize
the model to include out of steady-state dynamics.
Firms can open a vacancy to attract a worker at cost κ, but ex ante do not know whether
the match will result in full or part-time work. Workers match randomly with posting firms.
We assume that there exists a constant returns to scale matching technology, M(u, v), that is
common to all labor market participants. Following the common convention, we define u as the
stock of unemployed workers and v as the stock of vacancies. The matching function determines




, 1) ≡ q(θ), and
the job-finding rate of workers, M(u,v)
v




Workers and firms is ex ante identical, but experience shocks for the duration of a match.
Upon meeting, workers realize an iid match-specific productivity draw from a common distribu-
tion ǫ ∼ F (ǫ), which evolves over the duration of the match at a rate λT , depending on whether
they are part or full-time. After observing the match-specific productivity realization, firms
and workers jointly decide whether the match should result in part-time employment, full-time
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employment, or continued search for a different match. Below some productivity threshold ǫP ,
a worker would prefer to continue searching for employers, while the firm would similarly prefer
to open a new vacancy and search for a better suited worker. A draw above this threshold
ensures that the match will continue (the first margin), but the type of match remains to be
determined. Above a second productivity threshold, ǫF , workers and firms choose to make the
job full-time. Draws between ǫP and ǫF result in part-time employment. After determining
the type of employment, firms and workers agree on a schedule of wages according to a surplus
splitting rule (Nash Bargaining), and a schedule of hours that maximize the surplus of the
match. Each of the wage, the hours, and the employment type (part or full-time) may change
in response to productivity shocks.
At any point, an idiosyncratic productivity shock may realize and alter the employment
relationship. Workers and firms continue to follow the wage and hours schedule, but the job
may transition from full-time to part-time employment, should a realization ǫ′ ∈ [ǫP , ǫF ), ǫ ≥ ǫF
occur, or part-time to full-time if ǫ′ ≥ ǫF , ǫ ∈ [ǫP , ǫF ). Similarly, the match may realize a
productivity shock ǫ′ < ǫP , in which case the match dissolves.
We assume that part and full-time jobs operate different production technologies, YP < YF .
In addition to different production technologies, part and full-time matches incur different flow
costs that are required to ensure the continuation of a match, τP , and τF , for part and full-time
employment, respectively, with τP ≤ τF . We do not take an explicit stand on the interpretation
of these costs, and interpret them as a composite of costs associated with maintaining fixed
capital, training workers to use production technologies, taxes that would not be incurred in
the absence of a match, and required benefits that are either provided in unemployment or
involve dead-weight loss in their acquisition. For analytical simplicity, we assume that these
costs differ only by employment type, and that they are acyclical. Initially, we assume that the
aggregate state is stationary, z = z̄, but we relax this assumption when we simulate the model.
4.1 Benchmark Model
We first describe an environment where workers may be unemployed, or employed either in full
or part-time work. Within this environment, unemployed workers receive flow utility that is
given by:
r U = b+ γ + p(θ)
∫
(max{W F (x),W P (x), 0} − U) dF (x); (4.1)
where T ∈ {P, F} indexes part and full-time employment. Unemployed workers match with
firms at a rate p(θ), and transition to employment if the realized productivity ǫ ≥ ǫP . When
matched they receive the following flow value:
r W T (ǫ) = w + λTα
∫
(max{SF (x), SP (x), 0} − ST (ǫ)) dF (x); (4.2)
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where w is the wage and λT is the rate at which the match experiences idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. It is worth emphasizing that a full-time worker may transition to part-time, and vice-
versa, depending on the idiosyncratic productivity level of the match. Within a match, workers
transition from full to part-time work when ǫ′ < ǫF and from employment to unemployment
when ǫ′ < ǫP .
Unfilled vacancies receive the following flow value:
r V = −κ+ q(θ)
∫
(max{JF (x), JP (x), 0} − V ) dF (x)). (4.3)
where q(θ) is the contact rate of workers. Firms pay a flow cost of κ until they meet a worker,





max{JF (x), JP (x), 0} dF (x)
. (4.4)
Once matched, firms receive the following flow value:
r JT (ǫ) = zǫYT − τT − w + λT (1− α)
∫
(max{SF (x), SP (x), 0} − ST (ǫ)) dF (x); (4.5)
where zǫYT is the output associated with a type T = {P, F} employed worker, and τT is the
corresponding firm’s flow cost, τT = {τP , τF}, depending on whether the match results in full
or part-time employment, respectively. Without loss of generality, we focus on environments
where ǫF ≥ ǫP .
In any match, the surplus given productivity ǫ, and type T , is wages and profits, net of
outside options and costs:
ST (ǫ) = W T (ǫ)− U + JT (ǫ)− V (4.6)
= W T (ǫ)− U + JT (ǫ) (4.7)
after imposing the free entry condition (V = 0). Substituting Equation 4.2, Equation 4.1, and
Equation 4.5 into this expression, and using the free entry conditions and surplus sharing rules
yield the following expression for the surplus:
(r + λT ) S




SF (x)dF (x) +
∫ ǫF
ǫP




Given ǫP and ǫF , net worker flows into part-time employment, ė
P , full-time employment,
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ėF , and unemployment, u̇, are given by:
ėP = (P (θ)u+ λF e
F )[F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )]− (λP [1− F (ǫF ) + F (ǫP )])e
P (4.9)
ėF = (P (θ)u+ λP e
P )[1− F (ǫF )]− (λFF (ǫF ))e
F (4.10)
u̇ = λPF (ǫP )e
P + λFF (ǫP )e
F − p(θ)[1− F (ǫP )]u. (4.11)
For simplicity we assume that exogenous separations are zero, but relax this assumption in
our calibration.
4.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
Any equilibrium in this model is characterized by a wage function, w, a market tightness θ,
and thresholds ǫP and ǫF . There are additional transition rates ė
F , ėP , and u̇, and associated
stocks eF , eP , and u for full-time and part-time employment, and unemployment, respectively.
These functions satisfy
1. θ is determined by vacancy posting and is consistent with the free entry condition.
2. ǫP is the threshold productivity at which firms and workers are indifferent between re-
maining matched.
3. ǫF is the threshold productivity at which firms and workers are indifferent between part
and full-time work.
4. Wages w are determined by Nash Bargaining over the surplus of a match with worker
bargaining power α.
5. The employment rates are consistent with employment flows and both are consistent with
worker and firm decisions.
4.2.1 Steady-State Equilibrium
We focus on the steady-state in our benchmark model. The steady-state is defined by a policy
tuple (ǫP , ǫF , θ, w
∗, h∗), and steady-state employment rates eP∗, eF∗, u∗. The policy functions
are defined as above, and the employment rates are given by
eP =
(P (θ)u+ λF e
F ) [F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )]
(λP [1− F (ǫF ) + F (ǫP )])
; (4.12)
eF =
(P (θ)u+ λP e





P + λFF (ǫP )e
F
p(θ)[1− F (ǫP )]
. (4.14)
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4.2.2 Productivity Thresholds and Flows
There are two unique productivity shocks that define separation thresholds, ǫF , and ǫP . ǫF ,
the productivity above which matches are full-time, and below which matches are part-time is
determined by SF (ǫF ) = S
P (ǫF ). At this point, a match of productivity ǫF is equally-profitable
when constituted as either part or full-time employment. The second threshold, ǫP , is given
by the indifference point between part-time work and unemployment, SP (ǫP ) = 0. Figure 4.1





SP (ǫP ) = 0
ǫFǫP
u eP eF
Figure 4.1: Employment Thresholds
Proposition 1. The full-time threshold is given by
ǫF =
(r + λP )τF − (r + λF )τP
z((r + λP )YF − (r + λF )YP )
+
(λP − λF )(b+
α
1−αθκ)
z((r + λP )YF − (r + λF )YP )
+
λP (r + λF )
2 − λF (r + λP )
2









when λP = λF ,
ǫF =
τF − τP
z(YF − YP )
. (4.16)
16



















[1− F (x)]dx] (4.17)
Each threshold provides information on what drives part and full-time employment. For
full-time employment, the measure of workers is determined by the difference in cost and
productivity with part-time workers. As productivity of full-time increases, ǫF falls and more
workers move from part to full-time work. When we assume that λP = λF , it is also easy to
see how aggregate shocks will shift this threshold; we explore this further in the next section.
The part-time threshold responds both to the cost-benefit ratio for part-time employment (the
first line in Equation 4.17), and the continuation value accrued from increases in idiosyncratic
productivity and transitions to full-time employment.
4.3 Equilibrium Properties
In this section we explore the model properties. We start by showing that steady-state flows in
our model are consistent with our empirical findings in Section 3. Next, we perform a series of
comparative statics and show that they are qualitatively consistent with our previous findings.
In particular, we focus on transitions between part and full-time employed and show that they
can deliver the patterns observed in Figure 3.1b.
4.4 Steady-State Flows
Having defined the productivity thresholds, we can characterize the flows between employ-
ment types in the steady state. We are primarily interested in model predictions about the
ratio of transitions between employment states that we described in Section 3. We start by
characterizing the ratio of flows from part and full-time jobs to unemployment in the steady
state.









Consistent with the findings in Section 3, the model predicts a constant ratio of these flows,
which is equal to the ratio of the arrival rates of the two shocks. Next, we show the ratio of
flows between part and full-time employment.
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λP [1− F (ǫF )]
λF [F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )]
. (4.19)
Further, it is sufficient for flows from part-time to full-time exceed full-time to part time in the
steady-state if λP > λF and [1− F (ǫF )] > [F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )].
This proposition shows that if we restrict the parameter space, the model is able to replicate
the findings in Section 3 that flows from part-time to full-time exceed full-time to part time. In
particular, when λP > λF and [1− F (ǫF )] > [F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )] flows from part-time to full-time
exceed full-time to part time in the steady-state.
Last, we show that the model predicts that the ratio of flows out of unemployment to full
and part-time employment is proportional to flows between part and full-time employment,
consistent with our previous empirical findings.






[1− F (ǫF )]
[F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )]
(4.20)
which is proportional to flows between full and part-time employment (Equation 4.19) without
the proportionality factor λP
λF
.
It is worth highlighting that Figure 3.3c shows that this ratio is roughly equal to the ratio
of flows from part and full-time employment to unemployment times flows between part and
full-time employment. Such pattern is also predicted by our model. In the next section we
explore how these flows vary over the business cycle and under what conditions our model will
yield results consistent with our findings in Section 3.
4.5 Adjustments over the Business Cycle
Next, we assess employment in our model responds to changes in aggregate productivity by
conducting a series of comparative statics. Our model contains two key margins of adjustment
that determine employment. One is the utilization threshold, ǫF , the other one is the separation
threshold, ǫP . The magnitude of the response of both thresholds to aggregate shocks dictates
how employment adjusts in our economy.
The degree of cyclicality that each threshold exhibits depends upon the cyclicality of rents
as well as gains or losses from changes in employment utilization. The following proposition
shows the response for the full-time threshold.
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Proposition 6. Holding all else equal, the response of the utilization threshold to a change in




−(r + λP )(τF + b+
α
1−α
κ(θ − z ∂θ
∂z
))
z2((r + λP )YF − (r + λF )YP − λF (YF − YP )(1− F (ǫF )))
−
YP (r + λFF (ǫP ))









z2(YF − YP )
. (4.22)
It is worth noting that the first expression in this proposition can not always be signed. The
first term shows that as the cost of full-time employment increases. This threshold becomes
more countercyclical (equivalently, the measure of shocks that result in full-time employment
becomes more procyclical). The second term shows the interaction between the responses
of part and full-time employment. If an aggregate shock makes part-time employment more
lucrative (ǫP decreases by more), the impact on full-time employment is muted. Workers and
firms would prefer more matches to end in part-time employment, limiting the scope of the
effect on full-time employment.
When we impose that λP = λF this threshold is clearly countercyclical. It is also clear that
costs drive this cyclicality. On the other hand, if τF − τP < YF − YP an increase in τF and YF ,
that leaves net output unchanged, will increase the countercyclicality of this threshold.
Like the utilization threshold, the separation threshold depends on costs and the response
of full-time employment. We show the corresponding response in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Holding all else equal, the response of the separation threshold to a change in







κ(θ − z ∂θ
∂z
)
YP (r + λPF (ǫP ))
+
λP (YF − YP )(1− F (ǫF ))











κ(θ − z ∂θ
∂z
)
YP (r + λPF (ǫP ))
. (4.24)
This comparative static yields similar insights as the previous one. Let is now focus one
second equation in this proposition. When part and full-time employment yield the same output
(i.e., there is only one type of employment), changes in costs amplify the countercyclicality of
this threshold, a point noted by Pissarides (2009).
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Now we explore what conditions on these thresholds are required for our model to be
consistent with our findings in Section 3. We start with the ratio of flows into unemployment.





Because the separation thresholds are identical for part and full-time employment, this ratio
is acyclical. It is worth noting that when we depart from a steady-state analysis, the previous
will no longer hold. Even though it will remain close to acyclical. Next, we turn to flows out
of unemployment and flows between part and full-time employment.
Proposition 9. The cyclicality of the ratio of flows from unemployment to full-time relative





[(1− F (ǫP ))f(ǫF )
∂ǫF
∂z




[F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )]2
(4.26)
and this ratio is procyclical if the following condition is satisfied:
(1− F (ǫP ))f(ǫF )
∂ǫF
∂z














requires that the measure of shocks that yield employment (1−F (ǫP )) to be large enough relative
to shocks that yield full-time employment (1− F (ǫF )) not to reverse this type cyclicality.
Finally, we explore the properties of flows between part and full-time employment over the
business cycle, which is given by Equation 4.19. This is identical to the ratio of flows out of
unemployment, scaled by the frequency of shocks.






λP [(1− F (ǫP ))f(ǫF )
∂ǫF
∂z




λF [F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )]2
(4.28)
and this flow ratio is procyclical if the following condition is satisfied
(1− F (ǫP ))f(ǫF )
∂ǫF
∂z




This finding is simply scaling the flows out of unemployment by λP
λF
. This reflects the close
to fixed multiple between these ratios that we observed in Section 3.
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To be able to determine the procyclicality of the ratio of flows from unemployment to full-
time relative to flows from unemployment to part-time, we need to determine how the different
endogenous employment thresholds respond. Figure 4.2 depicts the impact of an aggregate





SP (ǫP ; z) = 0
SF (ǫ; z′)
SP (ǫ; z′)













Figure 4.2: Response to Aggregate Shocks
As we can see, the model’s prediction can be consistent with Proposition 9. Findings in
Section 3 suggest that flow from full-time employment to part-time employment is pro-cyclical.
This type of flow is mainly observed among workers staying within the same firm. Similarly,
flows from part-time employment to full-time employment is counter-cyclical, and is also found
primarily with workers staying within the same firm.
4.6 Acyclical Costs and Employment
An important aspect of our economic environment is that employers face differential acyclical
fixed costs that differ by worker utilization. This model feature reflects the fact that part and
full-time employment are critically shaped by legislation, resulting in different costs and legal
requirements.18 Next we analyze how changes in these costs affect the endogenous employment
thresholds. We first start with the full-time threshold.
Proposition 11. The effect of a change in full-time costs on the part/full separation threshold
18For instance, in the U.S., full-time jobs often offer paid time-off and employer-sponsored retirement pro-
grams. Moreover, employing firms are required to provide health insurance to workers. These features are not











]− (r2 − λPλF )(λP − λF )[1− F (ǫP )]
∂ǫP
∂τF
((r + λP )YF − (r + λF )YP )(r + λP )(r + λF )− (r2 − λPλF )(λP − λF )[1− F (ǫF )](YP − YF )
(4.30)





z(YF − YP )
. (4.31)
Like our findings for aggregate productivity in Section 4.5, the utilization threshold responds
in two distinct ways to changes in costs. First, the threshold increases because full-time matches
produce less surplus. Note, however, that the second term is ambiguous. The threshold may
decrease because the value of part-time employment is partially dependent on the possibility
that a worker may eventually transition to full-time work. However, it may also amplify the
impact if part-time employment is profitable on its own. The key takeaway is that as the value
of full-time work declines, it has a reverberating effect on part-time employment. Next, we
consider how the part-time threshold responds to changes in costs.
Proposition 12. The effect of a change in part-time costs on the employment/unemployment





(r + F (ǫP ))zYP
+
λP
r + F (ǫP )







As before, this expression varies with the response of the full-time threshold to part-time
costs. If the expected surplus of full-time employment declines, the utilization threshold may
increase as well, exacerbating the effects. If the surplus is largely unaffected, firms may shift
workers to full-time work.
5 Model Parametrization and Quantitative Results
In this section we discuss taking our model to the data. To do so, first we use functional forms
and a subset of parameters values commonly accepted in the search literature. After external
calibration of some parameter values, we use simulated method of moments by matching implied
steady-state flows generated by the model.
From now on, we approximate our model in discrete time at a weekly frequency, with
discount factor β = 1
1+r




In terms of functional forms, we make the common assumption that the matching function is
Cobb-Douglas, M(u, v) = Auηv1−η, where η is the elasticity parameter, and A the efficiency
parameter. We further assume that idiosyncratic productivity is described by ǫ ∼ LN(µǫ, σǫ),
and the evolution of aggregate productivity is given by ln(zt+1) = ρZ ln(zt) + ν, where ν ∼
N(0, σz). Throughout the rest of our quantitative analysis, we approximate the dynamics of
the aggregate shock using the method described in Tauchen (1986).
Given our functional forms, we follow the literature and externally calibrate a subset of our
parameters. We set the matching function elasticity to η = 0.72, following Shimer (2005), who
estimates this parameter directly from the data. We also make the common assumption that
the Hosios Condition holds. As a result, the bargaining power of a worker equals the elasticity
of the matching function with respect to unemployment; i.e, α = η = 0.72. We normalize
output of a part-time job to be YP = 1, so that all parameters are relative to part-time output.
We follow Fujita and Ramey (2012) and set vacancy creation cost, κ, the productivity cost of
6.7 hours of work. We assume the work is part-time and which yields κ = 0.2939 by taking
6.7 hours divided by an average of 22.8 hours per week for part-time work in our sample.
The appropriate value for unemployment utility is contentious, ranging from 0.4 estimated
by Shimer (2005) to 0.955, estimated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and has important
implications for labor market fluctuations in search models (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008).
We follow Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and set unemployment utility to b = 0.7. This is
conservative in our model because b is typically targeted as a fraction of average productivity,
which in our model exceeds 1. However, a high b results in little or no part-time employment.
As a result, we target 70% of part-time output. We consider an annual interest rate of 4%,
which yields a weekly interest rate of r = 0.0012. This results in a discrete discount factor,
β = 1
1+r
, of 0.9992. For parameters describing the aggregate productivity process, we follow
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), who estimate an AR(1) productivity process in a search model
yielding ρZ = 0.9895 and σZ = 0.0034.
After implementing this parametrization, we are left with 8 parameters to estimate: YF ,
τF , τP , λF , λP , σǫ, and A. We choose to calibrate these parameters internally rather than
externally because they are either novel (YF , YP , τF , τP , λF , λP ), affect the endogenous produc-
tivity process (σǫ), or are a normalization (A). We first impose the restriction on the arrival




. In our data, the average
arrival rates for PT − U and FT − U are 0.546 and 0.0087, respectively. Such values imply
λP = 6.23λF .
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5.2 Simulated Methods of Moments
To determine the 6 remaining parameters we use the simulated method of moments procedure.
In particular, we target steady state flows between full-time, part-time, and unemployment
as well as steady-state rates of part and full-time employment to discipline the value of the
remaining parameters. To do so, we estimate these series at a monthly frequency in the CPS
between 1996 and 2019, using the same sample restrictions that we described in Section 3.
Although our parameters are jointly estimated and therefore their sources of identification
are difficult to pin down explicitly, we can outline the moments most closely associated with
each parameter. The cost and productivity parameters YF , τF , τP determine the relative net
output of part and full-time work, and therefore primarily adjust employment levels. The arrival
rate of match-specific shocks for full-time work, λF , determines the frequency with which a full-
time worker may transition to part-time or unemployment, and σǫ determines the probability
of such a transition, and therefore are primarily identified by flows out of full and part-time
employment. The final parameter, A, proportionally changes the job-finding rate, and as a
result can be primarily associated with flows out of unemployment. The underlying parameter
values are reported in Table 1.
Parameter Value Comment
YF 5.51 Full-time prod.
YP 1.00 Part-time prod. (normalized)
τP 0.1602 Part-time cost
τF 4.24 Full-time cost
λF 0.0218 Rate of full-time ǫ shocks
λP 0.1363 Rate of part-time ǫ shocks (fixed to 6.23 times λF )
σǫ 0.1717 SD of ǫ shocks
A 0.1557 Matching efficiency
b 0.7 Unemp. utility (Fujita and Ramey, 2012)
η 0.7 Matching elasticity (Fujita and Ramey, 2012)
α 0.7 Hosios condition
β 0.9992 Annual discount rate of
κ 0.17 Vacancy creation cost (Fujita and Ramey, 2012)
ρZ 0.9895 Agg. shock persistence (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008)
σZ 0.0034 SD of agg. shocks (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008)
Table 1: Parameter Values.
5.3 Targeted Moments
After we assign parameter values according to the previous procedure, we find that the bench-
mark model is able to closely match all of the estimated targets. These are reported in Table 2.
As we can see, our model narrowly undershoots the job-finding rate of part-time work (0.0858
in the data versus 0.0807 in the model). As a result, the model overshoots the job-finding rate
of full-time work (0.2086 in the data versus 0.2134 in the model). Nevertheless, both of these
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Moment Data Model
Full-Time Emp. 0.9059 0.9031
Part-Time Emp. 0.0567 0.0592
U → FT 0.2086 0.2134
U → PT 0.0856 0.0807
FT → PT 0.0211 0.0224
PT → FT 0.3399 0.3389
FT → U 0.0087 0.0088
PT → U 0.0546 0.0537
Table 2: Estimation results.
equilibrium outcomes are still close to their data counterparts. The remaining moments are
within fractions of a percent. We achieve this fit with parameter values that closely align with
the results from previous papers.19
5.4 Non-Targeted Moments
In order to assess the performance of our benchmark parametrization, we now compare our
model predictions of non-targeted moments generated by the model with the corresponding
data counterparts. In particular, we first compare whether our model can produce similar
levels of cyclicality among employment stocks and flows as in the data. Then, we compare our
model’s predictions about employment stocks and flows between 1996 and 2020 to the data
using an estimated productivity series.
To do this comparison, we simulate the model with 1000 random series of productivity draws.
For each of the 1000 simulations, we calculate the covariance between labor productivity and
part and full-time employment as well as each flow between labor market states, part-time,
full-time, and unemployed.20 We present our findings in Table 3.
FT Emp. PT Emp FT→PT PT→FT FT→U PT→U U→FT U→PT
Lag Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
-1 0.45 0.72 -0.47 -0.70 -0.47 -0.55 -0.35 -0.23 0.46 0.49 -0.08 0.30 -0.22 -0.51 0.10 0.19
0 0.94 0.84 -0.91 -0.80 -0.96 -0.55 -0.70 -0.18 0.96 0.58 -0.12 0.43 -0.42 -0.52 0.23 0.19
+1 0.61 0.89 -0.26 -0.81 -0.65 -0.48 -0.27 -0.10 0.65 0.68 -0.08 0.46 -0.00 -0.50 0.06 0.23
Table 3: Non-targeted moments.
This shows that the benchmark model is able to replicate the cyclicality of the majority of
series. The model anomaly is that it predicts a weakly negative separation rate of part-time
jobs, where the data predicts a positive rate. However, the model matches the cyclicality of
19Our best fit yields a standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks (σǫ) of 0.172 and a matching scale parameter
(A) of 0.156, both slightly higher than their estimates in Fujita and Ramey (2012), 0.16 and 0.094. We find that
shocks arrive for full-time workers with probability λF = 0.0218 each week, which corresponds to λP = 0.1363
(6.23 times λF ). We estimate that acyclical costs constitute about 13.5% of part-time output (τP = 0.1602 with
YP normalized to 1) and 77.0% of full-time output (τF = 4.24 and YF = 5.51).
20We measure this as output/hours. In our model simulations, we set full and part-time hours to their averages
between 1996 and 2020, 46 and 22.8 hours respectively.
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part and full-time employment, despite slightly overstating the cyclicality of the flows between
part and full-time employment. It also does a reasonable job matching the cyclicality with a
one quarter lead or lag.
To further determine the performance of our framework, we simulate the model to the data
between 1996 and 2020. To do this, we first estimate a sequence of aggregate shocks Z1, ..., ZT
by targeting quarterly labor productivity in the data. We do this because productivity in our
model is endogenous. This is the case as both part and full-time work have different base levels
of productivity and because separation thresholds vary over time. We then feed this series into
the model and compare our results with the corresponding data counterparts. These different
series are depicted in Figure 5.1. The top two figures plot full and part-time employment in the
left and right panes, respectively. The bottom two figures display the aggregate employment
rate and the unemployment rate. In each figure, the dashed blue line with triangle markers
denotes the simulated data, while the red line with circle markers corresponds to the observed
data.
(a) Full-Time Employment (b) Part-Time Employment
(c) Employment Rate (d) Unemployment Rate
Figure 5.1: Comparison between observed and model generated employment.
Again, these figures show that our model does a good job replicating the cyclicality of each
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series. In particular, we find that both full-time employment and aggregate employment are
procyclical, while it predicts that both part-time employment and unemployment are counter-
cyclical. This is precisely what is observed in the data in Section 3. While the model does a
reasonable job matching the data for most years, the model does not generate fluctuations of the
same magnitude during the Great Recession. This suggests that in addition to the mechanisms
in the presented in the model, there are other forces at play, such as demand-side fluctuations.21
The model is able to replicate the flows observed in the data. In the top two panels of
Figure 5.2, we plot the flows from full-time to part-time (left) and part-time to full-time (right).
In the bottom two panels, we plot the flows from full-time to unemployment and part-time to
unemployment.
(a) Full-time to part-time (b) Part-time to full-time
(c) Full-time to unemployment. (d) Part-time to unemployment
Figure 5.2: Observed and model generated employment flows.
Although the model accounts for a large share of the volatility of each series, it doesn’t quite
capture the persistent increase in either the rate of workers flowing from full-time to part-time
or the rate of workers flowing from full-time to unemployment.
21We refer to (Warren, 2015) for more on this.
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The reason for the apparent inconsistency between the ability of our model to match flows
out of part and full-time employment and its inability to replicate the stock of employed workers
in Figure 5.1 is due to a well-known puzzle in the search and matching literature emphasized
by (Shimer, 2005). The model does not replicate the degree of volatility in the job-finding rate
that we observe in the data . We plot the job-finding rate of unemployed workers for full-time
jobs (left panel) and part-time jobs (right panel) in Figure 5.3.
(a) Unemployment to full-time. (b) Unemployment to part-time.
Figure 5.3: Observed and model generated employment flows.
While the model does better at capturing fluctuations in the full-time job-finding rate, it
predicts negligible fluctuations in the part-time job-finding rate. As pointed out by Shimer
(2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and Hall and Milgrom (2008), among many others,
this occurs because the bulk of the fluctuations in productivity are reflected by changes in
wages.
6 Exploring the Mechanisms
6.1 The Cyclicality of Part and Full-Time Employment
Before delving into the sources of cyclicality in the model, we explore the mechanisms that result
in the dynamics of the model. First, we explore how the utilization and separation threshold,
ǫF and ǫP , respectively, fluctuate in response to aggregate shocks. Second, we describe how
the endogenous distribution of match quality evolves over the business cycle. Last, we show
how aggregate shocks affect vacancy creation and as a consequence, market tightness and the
job-finding rate. Each of these mechanisms is an equilibrium object that responds to aggregate
shocks and determines flows in the labor market.
There are 6 flows as well as an equilibrium distribution of match quality that respond to each
mechanism. We first define a function G that denotes the distribution of match quality. We
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also define distribution functions GF and GP that track the distribution of full and part-time
work for convenience. The evolution of these three distributions are given by:
ĠF (x) = (λP e
P + λF e




ĠP (x) = (λP e
P + λF e




Ġ(x) = ĠP (x) + ĠF (x) (6.3)
The flows in the stochastic version of the model are largely similar to the steady-state
version that we introduced in Section 4, but now include the endogenous response of the match
quality distribution to aggregate shocks. Flows between part and full-time work respond to




= λF [F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )] + γ[G(ǫF )−G(ǫ̃F )] (6.4)
eP → eF
eP
= λP [1− F (ǫF )] + γ[G(ǫ̃F )−G(ǫF )] + γ[G(ǫP )−G(ǫ̃P )] (6.5)
eF → u
eF
= λFF (ǫP ) + γG(ǫP ) (6.6)
eP → u
eP
= λPF (ǫP ) + γG(ǫP ). (6.7)
where ǫ̃P and ǫ̃F denote the utilization and separation thresholds for the previous level of
aggregate productivity. The final two flows, those out of unemployment, and are determined by




= p(θ)[1− F (ǫF )] (6.8)
u → eP
u
= p(θ)[F (ǫF )− F (ǫP )]. (6.9)
As they appear in each flow, understanding the fluctuation of thresholds is key for under-
standing the flows in the model. To do this, we plot the utilization and separation thresholds
along with the aggregate shock, normalized to their values prior to the Great Recession in
Figure 6.1. The left panel plots the separation threshold, ǫP , as a dashed blue line with triangle
markers and aggregate productivity as a solid red line. The right panel plots the utilization
threshold, ǫF , as a dashed blue line with triangle markers and aggregate productivity as a solid
red line. We normalize each series 1 in the initial period.
These plots show a key mechanism in the model. The part-time separation threshold is less
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(a) Separation threshold. (b) Utilization threshold.
Figure 6.1: Thresholds over time, plotted with aggregate productivity. Normalized to 1.
cyclical than the full-time separation threshold, yielding one reason why full-time employment
is procyclical and part-time employment is countercyclical.
Next, we show how the endogenous distribution of match quality evolves over the business
cycle. Both flows between part and full-time employment and into unemployment respond to
the evolution of the distribution of match quality. In turn, the distribution of match quality
evolves as aggregate shocks affect the utilization and separation thresholds. To see how this
distribution changes over the business cycle, we consider the distribution at two moments in
time. First, we plot the un-normalized CDF of part-time employment across the domain of
idiosyncratic productivity (normalized to lie between 0 and 1). We include on this plot two
lines that denote the separation threshold (red line) and utilization threshold (yellow line) at
the bottom of the trough of the Great Recession. We repeat this for full-time employment and
plot our results in Figure 6.2, with part-time employment on the left and full-time employment
on the right.
(a) Part-time match quality distribution. (b) Full-time match quality distribution.
Figure 6.2: Match quality cumulative distributions at the peak prior to the Great Recession.
To see how this affects the distributions of match quality, we compare the match quality
distributions at the peak and trough of the Great Recession. We do this by overlaying the
distribution of the trough on the peak distribution for part and full-time employment and plot
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our results in Figure 6.3. The left figure plots the part-time distribution and the right panel
plots the full-time distribution. In both, the peak distribution is in blue, while the trough
distribution is in red.
(a) Part-time match quality distribution. (b) Full-time match quality distribution.
Figure 6.3: Match quality cumulative distributions at the peak prior to the Great Recession.
While the difference between the distributions is small, it has a sizable effect on employment,
as we show in Section 6.1.1.
Last, we explore the evolution of vacancy creation over the Great Recession in our model.
From Equation 6.8 and Equation 6.9, we can see that vacancy creation is key for job-finding
rates. To see how this changes over the business cycle, we plot the vacancy rate and the
unemployment rate as well as the expected surplus of a match during the Great Recession in
Figure 6.4 shows our results. In the left panel, we separately plot the vacancy rate (blue dashed
line) and the unemployment rate (red solid line), the ratio of which is labor market tightness, to
show the source of fluctuations in the job-finding rate. In the right panel, we plot the expected
surplus, a constant fraction 1− α of which is the value of opening a vacancy to an unmatched
firm.
(a) Vacancy and unemployment rates. (b) Expected surplus of a match.
Figure 6.4: Determinants of vacancy creation and the job-finding rate.
This shows that vacancy creation is procyclical and driven by fluctuations in the surplus.
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6.1.1 The Source of Cyclicality
Now, we turn to understanding what drives the procyclicality of full-time work and the counter-
cyclicality of part-time work in the model. In Section 5.4, we showed that the model is capable
of matching the degree of cyclicality in nearly all flows in the labor market, though it does not
match the magnitudes of the fluctuations. Here, we consider three experiments to understand
how the mechanisms described in Section 6.1 contribute to the cyclicality of the model.
First, we restrict the separation and utilization thresholds for matches that receive an id-
iosyncratic shock during the period and job-finding rates for all matches to their steady-state
level. To do this, we allow these thresholds to remain at their steady state levels, i.e., ǫP = ǫP (z̄)
and ǫF = ǫF (z̄) for any jobs that did not receive an idiosyncratic shock. The degree of cycli-
cality produced by this experiment is caused by the fluctuation in thresholds and the arrival of
idiosyncratic shocks. When we present our findings in Table 4, we call this restriction “Only
F (ǫP ), F (ǫF ).”
Second, we restrict the flow of idiosyncratic shocks to be zero (λP , λF = 0) and set the
job-finding rate to its steady-state value, p(θ) = p(θ(z̄)). This makes initial match quality
fixed within a match and means that jobs separate or change utilization only in response to
fluctuations in the thresholds. As a result, the remaining cyclicality is caused by the interaction
between the two thresholds and the match quality distribution. In Table 4 we call this restriction
“Only G(ǫP ), G(ǫF ).”
Last, we set the separation thresholds to their steady-state values and set the arrival rate
of idiosyncratic shocks to zero. This shows the contribution to cyclicality of fluctuations in the
job-finding rate. In Table 4 we call this restriction “Only θ.”
To calculate the effect of each experiment on cyclicality, we calculate the contemporaneous
correlation between our series of interest and aggregate productivity and compare it with the
model and the data. We present our findings in Table 4.
Sim FT Emp. PT Emp FT→PT PT→FT FT→U PT→U U→FT U→PT
Data 0.84 -0.80 -0.55 -0.18 0.58 0.43 -0.52 0.19
Base 0.98 -0.85 -0.98 -0.66 0.99 -0.06 -0.36 0.20
Only F (ǫP ), F (ǫF ) 0.81 0.76 -0.99 0.19 0.99 -0.92 0.50 -0.55
Only G(ǫP ), G(ǫF ) 0.98 -0.87 -0.97 -0.67 0.99 -0.90 -0.38 0.21
Only θ 0.83 0.91 -0.00 -0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.00 -0.00
Table 4: Cyclicality of different counterfactual models.
While these experiments are not nested, and therefore we cannot directly decompose the
degree of cyclicality caused by each source, we are clearly able to see which components drive
the cyclicality of each series. When there are only idiosyncratic shocks (“Only F (ǫP ), F (ǫF )”),
the cyclicality of separations increases substantially, while part-time employment becomes pro-
cyclical. When cyclicality is determined exclusively by aggregate shocks to the match quality
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distribution (“Only G(ǫP ), G(ǫF )”), the part-time to unemployment separation rate becomes
far too countercyclical. Last, when only θ is allowed to vary away from its steady-state value,
flows into unemployment become too procyclical, while job-finding rates become nearly acycli-
cal. This is because while p(θ) rate may be procyclical, neither threshold adjusts and as a result
mute the cyclicality.
As a final experiment, we consider how the cyclicality of the surplus drives our findings. We
consider a simple alternatives: a model in which a fraction ω of each acyclical cost responds
1-to-1 with fluctuations in aggregate productivity. We set this fraction to ω = 0.5 and present
the results in Table 5.
Sim FT Emp. PT Emp FT→PT PT→FT FT→U PT→U U→FT U→PT
Data 0.84 -0.80 -0.55 -0.18 0.58 0.43 -0.52 0.19
Base 0.98 -0.87 -0.99 -0.72 0.99 0.08 -0.15 0.15
τF = τF (z), τP = τP (z) 0.96 -0.54 -0.99 -0.66 1.00 0.92 -0.06 0.07
Table 5: Cyclicality when a 50% of the acylical costs are now cyclical.
While this counterfactual performs worse along some dimensions, like the cyclicality of
part-time employment, it performs better along others, like the cyclicality of the flows from
part-time to full-time. We see this as an indication that had we modeled costs as procyclical,
the mechanisms in our model continue to explain an important fraction of the cyclicality.
6.2 The Importance of Part-Time Employment
In this section, we show that ignoring employment utilization has important implications for
predictions about labor market fluctuations and the cost of downturns for workers.22 We
first demonstrate that a model that pools part and full-time employment together will both
i) underpredict the size of the decline in employment during a recession and ii) understate
the impact of a downturn on workers. Next, we simulate a counterfactual model without a
utilization distinction that matches the same steady-state as our baseline model and show the
differences in predictions during the Great Recession.
In models that derive from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), steady-state employment is
determined by the expected surplus and the separation threshold. These same quantities de-
termine steady-state employment in our model. The differences in that part and full-time
employment introduce a non-convexity in the surplus in our model. This means that given a
match quality ǫ ∈ [ǫP , ǫF ), workers in our model are more likely to separate than workers in
equally productive matches in a model without part-time work when both models are subject
to a negative aggregate shock. We plot the intuition for this result in Figure 6.5, by comparing
22This is important because only a handful of search models incorporate this dichotomy. Among them are
Warren (2015), Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2020).
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a hypothesized surplus function for our model with a model that lacks a utilization dichotomy.
The dashed red line shows the surplus in our baseline model, while the dashed blue line shows
the surplus in the hypothesized model without part-time employment. The solid red and blue




















Figure 6.5: Response to aggregate shocks.
Intuitively, while both economies suffer a decline in aggregate productivity, the lower surplus
among the part-time jobs causes a larger decline in employment. In the economy without a
utilization dichotomy, unemployment increases by ũ′. In our economy, unemployment would
increase by ũ′+u′. For further precision, we now calibrate a canonical search model and assess
the degree of difference in predictions.
To determine the effects of removing the intensive margin, we estimate a counterfactual
model in which there is no distinction between part and full-time employment. The model
retains the same estimate of A as in the baseline model and we set the arrival rate of shocks
λ to the population average in the baseline model, λ = λP e
P + λF e
F . The only distinction
between our counterfactual and the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model is that we include
an acyclical cost, τ , to keep rents procyclical so that our findings are comparable to our baseline
model. We subject the models to the same series of aggregate shocks as in our Great Recession
experiment and show how this compare to our baseline model in Figure 6.6. In the left panel,
we compare the impact of aggregate shocks on employment in both economies. In the right
panel, we compare the average surplus in both economies over this period. In both panels, the
baseline economy is the solid red line and counterfactual economy is the dashed blue line.
What these figures make clear is that for the same set of aggregate shocks, the impact is
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(a) Average employment. (b) Expected surplus of a match.
Figure 6.6: Employment and job creation.
muted in the counterfactual economy. While the downturn is still sizable in the counterfactual
economy, at the trough it remains 1.5 percentage points higher. The right panel shows that
the counterfactual economy continues to understate the effect on the average surplus from a
match.
This last finding provides suggestive evidence that the counterfactual economy may under-
state the impact on welfare and inequality. To see this, we place the variance in income in
both economies (left panel) as well as the variance in the surplus (right panel) in Figure 6.7.
Both calculations include unemployed workers, who receive identical incomes b and surplus
S(ǫP (z), z). As before, in both panels the baseline economy is plotted as a solid red line and the
counterfactual economy is plotted as a dashed blue line.
(a) Variance of income. (b) Variance of the surplus.
Figure 6.7: Inequality in both economies.
While these values appear small, it’s worth noting that these are both weekly values averaged
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over a quarter. Given that our weekly wages are around 1 and average annual income in
the United States is around $35,000, these predicted differences become sizable at an annual
frequency. Our baseline economy consistently predicts a variance of income more than double
that of the economy without part-time utilization. In addition, because agents in our model
are risk neutral, the effect on welfare is muted; in a model with risk averse agents, it is not
difficult to conjecture that the variance in welfare could be much larger because of the higher
degree of unemployment and the lower wages among part-time workers.
7 Policy Experiments
Our model presents a natural setting in which to consider the effectiveness of labor market
policies at limiting the size and duration of downturns in the labor market. Because unem-
ployment insurance (UI) is often extended during recessions (both the Great Recession and the
Covid-19 Recession), we consider this our baseline policy that the government finances during
a downturn. As an alternative, we consider an equally costly "job-subsidy," in which the gov-
ernment instead finances transfers to firms to retain employees. We compare the effect of these
two policies on the labor market recovery as well as the decline in output that results from a
recession.
To compare these policies during a downturn, we impose a 7% decline in aggregate produc-
tivity (the lower limit of our productivity grid) and then implement policies as follows. First, we
institute a 20% increase in unemployment utility, b, which we assume is completely financed by
the government. Then, we consider a job subsidy τ ′T (either part or full-time), where τT − τ
′
T is
financed by the government. We impose that the cost of the job subsidy must equal the cost of
the additional unemployment benefits. In each experiment, we assume that prior the economy
is in the steady-state prior to the recession and that these policy changes are unanticipated.
Once these policies are instituted, agents expect them to last for the duration of the recession.
After 8 quarters, we assume that aggregate productivity returns to the steady-state and poli-
cies return to their baseline levels; agents no longer anticipate the previous policy regime. To
achieve the same costs, τP fell from 0.1602 to -0.011 in the part-time job subsidy, while τF fell
from 4.24 to 4.19.
Despite small changes in each acyclical cost, both job-subsidy economies recover more
rapidly and suffer a smaller decline than the UI expansion economy. We first explore dif-
ferences in aggregate outcomes in Figure 7.1. We start by comparing aggregate employment
(left panel) and aggregate output (right panel) for the three policies. In each plot, the UI
expansion is the solid red line, the part-time subsidy is the dashed yellow line, and the full-time
subsidy is the dashed blue line.
The economy with the part-time subsidy endures both a smaller decline in employment and
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(a) Employment (b) Output
Figure 7.1: Determinants of vacancy creation and the job-finding rate.
a smaller decline in output. In fact, there is nearly no decline in employment despite a drop
in aggregate productivity of 7%. The full-time job subsidy also performs better than the UI
expansion, although it results in a larger decline in employment and output than the part-time
subsidy.
Next, we explore the reasons for the smaller decline in employment and output for the two
job subsidies. In Figure 7.2, we show the job-finding rate (top left panel), the separation rate
(top right panel), part-time employment (bottom left panel) and full-time employment (bottom
right panel).
This figure yields insight into the reasons why part-time subsidies outperform the two al-
ternative policies. In the part-time subsidy economy, there is still a decline in job-finding,
indicating that the expected surplus of a match falls. However, there is only a marginal in-
crease in the separation rate. Why is that the case? Because vacancy creation is costly and
retaining a match provides more surplus than searching for a new one. In both the part and
full-time subsidy economies, firms hoard workers at part-time utilization, while part-time falls
to zero in the UI expansion economy.
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(a) Job-finding rate. (b) Job separation rate.
(c) Part-time employment rate. (d) Full-time employment rate.
Figure 7.2: Comparison between each policy experiment economy.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a framework that can account for the cyclicality of part and full-time
employment. We accomplish this by extending a canonical search model to include acyclical
costs that, along with output, vary by part or full-time utilization. This allows firms another
type of adjustment in response to shocks that alter aggregate productivity or match quality.
We show that adjustments in utilization in response to aggregate shocks play a key role
in the cyclicality of part and full-time employment. Adjustment in separation and utilization
both increase the procyclicality of part-time employment. However, the movement from full-
time to part-time employment causes part-time employment to become countercyclical. We also
show that models with a single extensive margin understate both the degree of employment
fluctuations and the impact of those fluctuations on inequality.
We additionally show that part-time employment can be exploited by policy-makers to
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limit the size and duration of downturns in the labor market. We compare an expansion in
unemployment insurance, a policy undertaken in each of the last three recessions, against a
subsidy offered to firms that retain workers part-time. We find that the "job subsidy" strongly
outperforms the expansion in unemployment insurance, despite holding costs fixed under both
policies. Although this policy prevents low quality matches from separating, it also prevents
a sizable loss of intangible capital caused by matching frictions. We view this as a strong
endorsement of a job-subsidy scheme in response to future downturns.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Equation 4.15 and Equation 4.17
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Proof. Both thresholds can be solved explicitly by operating on the surplus equation. Without
loss of generality, we assume that ǫF ≥ ǫP . Integrating by parts, the surplus in Equation 4.8 is
generically expressed as follows:
(r + λT ) S











[1− F (x)] dx+ YP
∫ ǫF
ǫP
[1− F (x)] dx
]
. (A.1)
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